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Abstract 
 
Since being accepted as a candidate in 2005, the Republic of Turkey has been part of erratic 
accession negotiations with the European Union. While initially hopeful, EU and Turkish 
narratives around this process have oscillated wildly between three separate states: convergence, 
cooperation, and divergence. This paper explores the steady changes in these themes and what 
they mean for Turkey’s public opinion and its future accession negotiations. Through its analysis 
of these themes, this paper concludes that institutional narratives on accession have a substantial 
impact on the way accession is viewed by the Turkish public. With this in mind, an exploration of 
causal links in the narratives of EU and Turkish institutions on the matter are key to determining 
the path of future negotiations, or perhaps even their cessation. Considering that the success of 
accession is largely dependent on popular support, the severe divergence in accession narratives 
has consequences for the future of Turkey’s accession bid.  In light of this linkage of public opinion 
and narratives, it seems clear that the processes of accession actually lead to a culture of count-
conduct amongst Turkish leaders and increased the strength of Eurosceptic sentiments, rather than 
inculcating European values. As such, the process of accession needs to be re-evaluated, instead 
being replaced with a strategic partnership. 
 
 
Written for Topics in Foreign and Security Policy (Dr. Iakovos Iakovidis). 
Presented at the James Madison University - Max Weber Programme Graduate Symposium, 
EUI, Fiesole, Italy, 7 April 2017 
 
1 
 
The Accession process has been one of the European Union’s key foreign policy tools 
since its founding. Through it, the EU has consistently sought to induce reforms, thus bringing 
Europe’s near abroad in to alignment with its objectives. In light of recent events in Turkey, 
there is cause now to doubt this process’s efficacy. In fact, it seems to be clear that the accession 
process has led to lower trust in the EU within Turkey, and research indicates that the ongoing 
process has led to a culture of counter-conduct within the Turkish government.  When viewed 
alongside Turkish attitudes towards accession, it becomes clear that narratives on the matter have 
a clear effect on the attitudes of Turkish citizens. With this in mind, close attention must be paid 
to the narrative being promoted by both sides of the accession process, as these narratives 
directly impact the legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of the Turkish people. It then follows that 
clear trends in these narratives could viewed as harbingers of things to come, and this has dire 
implications for the future of the accession process in Turkey. 
Literature Review 
 
The topic of EU-Turkish relations and Turkish Accession has received a considerable 
amount of attention from the scholarly community, and this document draws heavily from their 
work. As this work is underpinned by an apparent increase in de-europeanization and counter-
conduct inside of Turkey, Gozde Yilmaz’s work on the topic must be mentioned. His use of 
counter-conduct in analyzing the EU-Turkey relationship lends credence to the increasing 
divergence in behaviors between Ankara and Brussels1. Finally, Canan Balkır and Sedef 
Eylemer’s piece on elite discourse inside of Turkey guided my work on the topic.2 Regrettably, 
their work also fails to account for recent changes in the discourse, an issue this piece hopes to 
remedy. This piece’s contribution to the existing literature is not that it explores a virgin 
landscape in the political sciences, so much as it draws disparate aspects of the sciences together 
in a unique fashion.  
 
Methodology  
 
Before engaging with EU-Turkish narratives, it is important to explain this paper’s 
methodology. This paper is predominantly a thematic analysis of narrative structure in EU and 
Turkish public statements, paired with quantitative measurements of public opinion inside of 
Turkey.  This analysis will ask what type of messages are being sent on the topics related to 
Turkish accession to the EU by both sets of actors. Once that is done, these messages will show 
the change in narrative over time and will be compared to changes in public opinion over time. 
We posit that the decreases in public trust in the EU, europeanization and faith in the accession 
process move in tandem with the narratives being presented by the EU and Turkish officials. 
Given the responsiveness of Turkish public opinion to elite rhetoric, it stands to reason that this 
can be a harbinger of future trends, indicative of a failure in enlargements purpose. When 
combined with the increase in counter-conduct amongst Turkish elite, this indicates that the 
                                                          
1 Münevver Cebeci (2016) De-Europeanisation or Counter-Conduct? 
Turkey’s Democratisation and the EU, South European Society and Politics, 21:1, 119-132, 
2 Canan Balkır & Sedef Eylemer (2016) Shifting Logics: The Discourses of Turkish Political 
Elites on EU Accession, South European Society and Politics, 21:1, 29-43 
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accession process and the rhetoric around it are in fact achieving the opposite of its intended 
purpose. If the accession process is meant to achieve convergence in policy and action, then, in 
the case of Turkey, we can use elite narratives to judge the effectiveness of the process. This will 
be typified by three general narratives: Essentially, we will be tracking changes in the accession 
narratives and ask if the changes therein are reflected in public sentiment.  
 
Overview of the Accession Process 
 
Turkish accession to the EU has a long and turbulent history, and its import to the 
European Union cannot be overstated. In order to understand the state of accession narratives in 
during the Juncker commission, it is important to examine the key issues that have dominated the 
accession process since 2005. The accession process immediately following the opening of 
negotiations in 2005 was packed with acquis driven reforms in Turkey, with the Science and 
Research chapter opened and closed in less than a year. This process slowed considerably in 
December 2006, when disputes over Turkish recognition of Cyprus flared. This resulted in the 
freezing of eight accession chapters along with the statement from the Commission that no more 
chapters would be closed until a resolution was found. The next year saw France freeze the 
economic and monetary chapters of accession, prompting significant backlash from Turkish 
elites. For the purposes of this piece, what is important to note is that the narratives surrounding 
enlargement quickly shifted from convergence to, at best cooperation, and, at worst, conflict.  
 
This leads us to the events transpiring under the 2014-2019 Commission, which have 
shaped the narrative considerably. The events of this commission must be framed in light of an 
understanding of Juncker Commission’s stance on enlargement. Simply put, Juncker stated 
clearly at the start of his term that no enlargement would take place under his term, a statement 
that colors every aspect of the accession process during this period3. In the previous 
Commission, a single event stands out in the narrative of Accession: Gezi Park. Recep Erdogan, 
the President of Turkey was pushing demolition of public park in order to build a mosque, which 
prompted the largest public protest in Turkey’s recent history. This protest was violently 
repressed, causing EU-Turkey relations to ebb. Interestingly, the current Commission’s 
relationship with the EU was dominated by a single topic: migration. Despite the crackdown on 
freedom of speech during this time, the Commission was actively seeking Turkish assistance in 
stemming the flow of irregular migrants. Within months of the signing of the March 2016 Joint 
Statement on Migration, an attempted coup rocked the Turkish state, ending a key period of 
cooperation. The Erdogan presidency’s response to this coup was almost more important than the 
coup itself, and now vies for prominence with the migration issue in EU-Turkey dialogues.  
 
Changes in Document Narratives 
2013 Document Narratives  
First, it is imperative to examine how the Commission’s perspective on Turkish 
Accession has changed, and, most importantly, how it has communicated that through official 
                                                          
3 Juncker, Jean-Claude. 2014. A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness 
and Democratic Change. Strasbourg, 22 October 2014 
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documents from 2014-2018. As the reports have been issued over time, it becomes clear that the 
Commission has taken an increasingly harsh tone, following the deteriorating state of democracy 
in Turkey. While the reports are key to understanding the Commissions stance on the topic, what 
is particularly revealing is language used in its enlargement strategy papers and the progress 
reports. These documents set out the Commission’s entire perspective, allowing us to contrast 
the narrative surrounding Turkey with that of the Western Balkans. For the sake of context, a 
brief look at the 2013 enlargement papers gives us a sense of the differing approach found in 
these two Commissions. The 2013 Strategy emphasizes Turkey’s progress, drawing attention 
first to “important progress” on judicial reforms and its “much anticipated democratization 
package.”4 It follows this up by lauding Turkey’s “historic” peace talks with the PKK, only then 
mentioning the Gezi park protests and police responses.5 Even when addressing such a divisive 
topic, the Barroso Commission takes a soft tone, limiting its language to “serious concerns” over 
the “handling of demonstrations.”6 This stands sharp contrast with later Commission documents 
on the subject. Furthermore, the Commission compares the Turkish economy with that of the 
Western Balkans, highlighting its “large, dynamic economy” while pointing out the lack of said 
economy in the Balkans.7 In fact, this Commission emphasizes that the Turkish economy is a 
“valuable component of EU competitiveness.”8 It goes on to state emphasize that cooperation 
with Turkey would be “enhanced” due to its “strategic location and potential as an energy hub.”9 
Indeed, the Commission uses very positive language when discussing deepening the customs 
union, such as “looking forward” to it reviewing “further progress” in energy market 
integration.10 One of the few overt criticisms in the strategy involved the protection of minority 
rights and fighting discrimination. As will soon be seen, this language does not survive 2013.  
 
This approach contrasts interestingly with the European Parliaments stance that year. The 
EP’s resolution on the 2013 Commission Progress Report takes a different direction, though it is 
tamer in tone than later parliament documents. While the Commission notes issues, the 
Parliament brings the Gezi park incident to the fore early in the document by the Council of 
Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights report. This is provocative and far stronger in tone 
than the Commission documents, which note the Gezi Park protests only in passing, without 
taking a strong stance. Immediately thereafter, the document refers to the accession process as 
“long lasting and open-ended.”11 Despite this, it reaffirms Turkeys special status as a strategic 
partner and that it is key to the EU’s competitiveness. It even goes as far as lauding various 
democratic changes and progress on human rights. Importantly, Turkey’s role in energy 
provision is highlighted in bright language, such as “potential for… both to benefit,” “pivotal” 
and “rich, renewable energy.”12 Additionally, this document points out Turkeys key role as an 
                                                          
4 European Commission. 2013. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014.  
5 Ibid 
6 Ibid 
7 Ibid 
8 Ibid 
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid 
11 European Parliament. 2014. European Parliament Resolution of 12 March 2014 on the 2013 
Commission Progress Report on Turkey (2013/2945(RSP) 
12 Ibid 
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“important regional player.”13 Key for our understanding of the EP’s perspective is the following 
statement, as it deviates substantially from later documents: “notes the transformative power of 
negotiations between the Union and Turkey.”14  It goes on to state that a credible accession 
process is key for promoting Turkish reforms. The Parliament’s praise on the reforms on the 
Constitution and the establishment of the Turkish National Human Rights Institution is loud, 
using strong language. As for points of contention, the document states its worry over dangers 
posed to democracy, urging the Turkish government to remedy this and that the profiling of 
public servants was worrying. The strongest oppositional language on Turkish accession only 
comes from the issue of Cyprus and Turkey’s refusal to recognize it. Only then does the 
Parliament state that it “deplores” Turkish actions.15 Interestingly, the Parliament only “deeply 
regrets” or has “great concerns” over problem areas in this document, but still make a point of 
highlighting Turkish failures just as often as praising them.16  
 
2014 Document Narratives 
While the Juncker commission was inaugurated in 2014, the enlargement strategy of that 
year was formulated and published by the Barroso Commission in October of that year. 
Interestingly, there is a substantial shift in Commission narratives over this time. Where once 
there was a tone of convergence and approval, now the Turkey’s prospects are presented as 
dimming. In this document, the Western Balkans are held to have a “credible perspective” with 
regards to EU enlargement, yet Turkey is conspicuously absent when this credibility is 
discussed.17 It applauds loudly the changes in the Balkan states but emphasizes its concerns 
about Turkey’s rule of law and judicial independence. Instead of lauding the reform packages 
and Kurdish peace talks, these are only mentioned in passing as “continuing” from previous 
years.18 Interestingly, the previous document emphasized the strength of the “dynamic” Turkish 
economy, but the 2014 strategy highlights the imbalances inherent in it, while emphasizing 
Turkey’s reliance on the EU economically. This does not seem to dampen the Commission’s 
fervor for a deepening of the customs union, however, which it drives home as in the “mutual 
interest” and of “strategic importance.”19 Energy market integration is highlighted once again, 
but without the positive signifiers of previous documents, citing the strategic elements.  Oddly, 
the Commission chose to emphasize Turkish judicial reforms and protections of fundamental 
rights based on decisions of the Constitutional Court. Considering the Commission’s “serious 
concerns” this stands out sharply in an otherwise gloomy document.20 It further calls attention to 
the failures with regards for women’s’ rights “particularly in Turkey,” juxtaposing it with 
Kosovo and omitting reference to any other Balkan states.21 This document felt the need to 
emphasize that “active and credible accession negotiations” could not be replaced by any 
                                                          
13 Ibid 
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid 
16 Ibid 
17 European Commission. 2014. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-2015 
18 Ibid 
19 Ibid 
20 Ibid 
21 Ibid 
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alternative, noting its “unrivalled scope and depth.”22  It concludes that these negotiations “need 
to regain momentum.”23 In a stark departure from 2013 dialogue, this strategy emphasized the 
EU’s appreciation of Turkey’s role as a regional security actor, stating that this growth should be 
coupled with European positions.  
 
2015 Document Narratives 
In 2015, the EP’s resolution on the topic becomes significantly less approving, with 
negative language both strengthening and expanding in use.24 As a clear indicator of tone, the 
document quickly references the Parliament’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide, a highly 
contentious issue for Turkey.25 Notably, every Resolution on the Commission Reports on Turkey 
following this include a less than positive signal to the Turkish people. This follows a clear 
name-and-shame narrative. It also brings the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the document 
early on as well as European Convention of Human Rights. This is a clear departure from earlier 
documents. It also lends its support to the Commission assessment of how further enlargement 
for the next five years. Soon thereafter, the EP pointedly highlights external reports by Freedom 
House and Reporters without Borders, both of which condemn Turkish human rights violations. 
Even with this assessment, the document still highlights the cooperative narrative, pointing out 
the need for Turkey to remain a strategic partner in energy, economy and foreign policy.26 This 
statement is lengthy, highlighting its importance, and moreover, we begin to see considerable 
focus on “an effective functioning relationship” and mutual benefit. Additionally, this document 
goes on to condemn actions by the Turkish government against freedom of expression. 
Importantly, this is the first time these documents state that Turkey’s actions are “incompatible 
with the fundamental rights of the EU and thus in conflict with the accession process.”27 Even so, 
it uses subdued language to praise continuing reforms, while increasing its criticisms of the 
Turkish state.   
 
The 2015 Enlargement Strategy represents the Juncker Commission’s first foray into the 
Accession statements, and, as such, is a signal of things to come.  In the introduction, the 
document quickly points out that Turkey is a key element of the Enlargement Strategy, but 
couples that with a distinct caveat. It emphasizes that the negotiations are “moving forward only 
slowly.”28 This, it claims, comes from a variety of issues, not the least of which being 
“shortcomings of the judiciary.”29 It points out that the Kurdish peace talks have broken down 
and “political confrontations.”30 In keeping with Juncker’s statements at the start of his tenure, 
                                                          
22 Ibid 
23 Ibid 
24 It must be mentioned that this document is in response to the 2014 Report on Turkey but is published 
in 2015 under a new legislative term. From this we can assess a clear change in the tones of both 
Parliaments.   
25 European Parliament. 2015. European Parliament Resolution of 10 June on the 2014 
Commission Progress Report on Turkey (2014/2953(RSP).  
26 Ibid 
27 Ibid 
28 European Commission. 2015. EU Enlargement Strategy. 
29 Ibid 
30 Ibid 
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this document lauds the improvements of all accession states, but points out that none will be 
ready for accession during the term of his Commission.31 As previous documents, this one 
highlights how exceptional the Turkish economy is by comparison to the Western Balkans. In a 
distinct shift from previous documents, this Strategy “welcomes” the “encouraging positive steps 
on the Cyprus settlement talks.”32 The language here is important to note. While using very 
positive tones, the Commission emphasized that “it is now urgent” for Turkey to fulfil their 
“obligation” to implement the Additional Protocol, holding out the incentive of “new 
momentum” towards accession.33 Importantly, this document places Turkey and the Western 
Balkans side by side in their failure with regards to freedom of expression and discrimination. As 
previous documents, this Strategy emphasizes the “high potential and continuing imbalances” in 
the Turkish economy, while emphasizing the continuing downturn in the market’s prospects and 
“moderate growth.”34 In a further development of the previous documents, this strategy lists 
concrete efforts to deep economic cooperation with Turkey, such as “aligning positions in the 
G20” and the “comprehensive impact assessment” of the Customs Union.35 This document 
emphasizes that despite these issues, this Commission “is ready to reengage with Turkey.”  
 
2016 Document Narratives 
2016 was turbulent year for EU Turkey relations, and the Enlargement Strategy for that 
year reflects it. In the introduction, the Commission granted pride of place to development inside 
of Turkey, a change of pace considering the prominence of the Western Balkans in previous 
Strategies. The Commission begins by highlighting the success of EU-Turkey Cooperation on 
the Migration Crisis, cooperation that were able “to revitalize” the relationship.36 It followed this 
immediately by condemning the coup attempt of July 15 but notes that the events of that coup 
shook “democratic institutions and society as a whole.”37 This is a very passive way of noting 
that these elements are not as the EU would like but will not come out against them. Importantly, 
the Strategy emphasizes the legitimacy of Turkey’s swift response, calling the coup an “attack on 
the democratically elected institutions.”38 It follows this up later with an insistence on the 
proportionality requirement and the “respect for human rights.”39 This indicates that the EU does 
not in fact believe that these are being followed. The Commission contrasts the judicial reforms 
in Serbia and Albania with failures in the Turkish arena, citing problems of judicial 
independence in the wake of the coup. It goes on to note “significant short comings” in the realm 
of fundamental rights, once again contrasting the “broadly stable” nature of the Balkans 
fundamental rights situation with significant retrenchment in Turkey.40 It goes on to note that 
freedom of expression “deteriorated further significantly.”41 Once again, the Strategy contrasts 
Western Balkans reforms in the realm of public administrative reform with Turkish backsliding, 
                                                          
31 Ibid 
32 Ibid 
33 Ibid 
34 Ibid 
35 Ibid 
36 European Commission. 2016. 2016 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy. 
37 Ibid 
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid 
41 Ibid 
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highlighting the negative effects of the mass dismissals on the effectiveness of public 
administration. The language there is rather oblique, by way of criticism. It does not criticize the 
dismissal, rather noting that they may impact professionalism and efficiency.42 It notes the 
upturn in the Turkish economy but links worries about the response to the coup attempt to 
possible economic uncertainty. Additionally, this document reminds Turkey’s attempt to 
reinstitute the death penalty, a move that directly contravenes the EU acquis.  Regardless, this 
document ends its assessment of Turkey with a positive note, one indicative of how this relation 
has continued to progress.43 In light of cooperation over the migration crisis and EU-Turkey 
Statement of 2016, the Commission emphasizes a deepening of “relations in key areas of joint 
interest.” 
 
The EP took a strong, anti-accession stance in the 2016 Resolution. Much of the previous 
Resolution was recycled into this one, including the recognition of the Armenian genocide and 
external reports on Turkey’s press freedoms. Notably, the freedom of journalists was moved to 
the very front of the document, becoming part of the first line of the resolution. This sets the tone 
for the remainder of the document. As a result, this is one of the most strongly worded ever 
released on Turkish accession. Early on, the document calls attention to the EP’s previous call 
for the freezing of accession negotiations with Turkey. Notably, the Commission ignored this 
call, perhaps due to the timing. It then goes on to recognize that economic difficulties in Turkey 
are due to defense and instability, but then pointedly expresses its doubts about Turkish 
economic stability by claiming that there are “deeper underlying problems with the economy.”44 
Interestingly, there is a new addition to this document, an explicit recognition of the Turkish 
diaspora in the EU. It links the diaspora to EU prosperity directly and this addition follows a 
conflict between Erdogan and the Netherlands over said diaspora. Once again, a case of 
narratives clashing, even in a small portion of the text. In the Introduction, this document quickly 
states that the post-coup crackdown has had “disproportionate and long-lasting negative effects 
on a large number of citizens as well as on the protection of fundamental rights.”45 Even so, the 
document spends entire paragraphs outlining the necessity of close relations with Turkey, driving 
home the cooperation narrative at the exact same time that it castigates the Turkish elite for 
various flaws. This clear “regression in the areas of rule of law and human rights” is repeatedly 
highlighted, and the document makes explicit mention of weakening “public support for 
Turkey’s full integration.”46 Soon thereafter, it reiterates it call for the suspension of 
negotiations. In yet another contentious point, it applauds member state actions in taking in 
Turkish refugees who were persecuted by the state and calls on the Commission to suspend pre-
accession funds in yet another punitive measure. Finally, in one of the smallest, but most 
interesting additions, this Resolution asks to be translated in to Turkish, a point absent in every 
iteration of this document since 2013.47 But why? They already are being sent to relevant 
Turkish ministries, and no previous copies explicitly called for translation. It is the opinion of 
                                                          
42 Ibid 
43 Ibid 
44 European Parliament. 2017. European Parliament Resolution of 6 July 2017 on the 2016 
Commission Progress Report on Turkey (2016/2308(RSP).  
45 Ibid 
46 Ibid 
47 Ibid 
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this piece that the EP was translating this into Turkish for the benefit of the Turkish people. In 
other words, they were explicitly attempting to influence the narrative on accession in Turkey.  
 
2018 Document Narratives 
The 2018 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy is jarring in its tone, which is a 
continuation of disapproval from the previous documents coupled with a significant lack of 
positive signifiers found in previous documents.48 This document begins with one of the most 
distinct signals for the Commission’s position. This document explicitly states a “credible 
enlargement perspective for and enhanced engagement with the Western Balkans,” notably 
excluding Turkey.49 They go on to refer to Turkey as a “candidate country” and a “key partner,” 
where “dialogue… and cooperation in areas of joint interest have continued.”50 As a further and 
more blatant signal, it states that Turkey is “moving away from the European Union” and that the 
EU has repeatedly brought this up to the Turkey as a “matter of priority.”51 The implication of 
this statement is that they are ignoring the EU’s pleas. It goes on to note the rule of law situation, 
claiming that it “continued to deteriorate.”52 In judicial reform, the Commission once again uses 
one of its favorite narrative devices, juxtaposition. It lauds Albanian judicial reform in bright, 
shining terms such as “unprecedented” and calling it a “boost” to the professionalism of its 
judicial branch.53 The failures of Turkey are immediately contrasted with this Western Balkans 
success story, by highlighting its mass dismissals and failures in judicial independence. The 
same method follows in the area of fundamental rights, where efforts to enshrine these rights in 
legislation are successful in the Western Balkans but strongly deteriorating in Turkey. 
Additionally, freedom of expression in Turkey is “seriously backsliding,” explicitly mentioning 
150 imprisoned journalists.54 Despite the ongoing nature of this violation, this is the first time a 
concrete number of journalists jailed inside Turkey has made it into the communication strategy. 
It goes on to mention that rights to defense had been “curtailed” under the State of Emergency55. 
It further goes on, calling into question the proportionality of Turkey’s response to the coup 
attempt, noting that democracy and legislative strength had been severely hindered as a result. As 
a bright spot, the Commission uses exceptionally positive language on the issue of Turkish 
efforts during the migration crisis, amplified even further by its proximity to so many dismal 
assessments. In this section, it calls Turkey’s work “an outstanding effort,” emphasizing that 
“cooperation...continued to deliver concrete results.”56 As for economics, the tone continues to 
be positive, referring to “significant economic potential.” It points out that the Turkish economy 
“rebounded strongly,” but called into question the business environment and investor 
confidence.57  
                                                          
48 It must be mentioned that Commission changed the method of progress reporting on accession 
states. As such, there is no 2017 Progress Report on Turkey. This helps explain, in part, the jarring 
differences in Commission narrative between 2016 and 2018. 
49 European Commission. 2018. 2018 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy. 
50 Ibid 
51 Ibid 
52 Ibid 
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid 
55 Ibid 
56 Ibid 
57 Ibid 
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While not quite the same as the 2016 Resolution, the EP’s Resolution on the 2018 
Progress Report on Turkey was the most anti-accession document to date. Following the pattern 
of the previous Resolution, the issue of press freedom and human rights violations set the tone 
for the document and soon thereafter we find a reference to Turkish violations of Cyprus’s 
exclusive economic zone. Additionally, the issue of Greek Orthodox property rights moves up in 
importance to the front of the document. The document references a study which found pre-
accession assistance has only had limited impact on Turkish alignment with the acquis, which 
only amplifies the EP’s point that pre-accession funds should be cut.58 It moves quickly into 
reminding everyone that it has repeatedly called for a suspension of accession negotiations, 
which quickly becomes a prime theme of the document. In a direct accusation, the document 
states that the Turkish government has carried out “illegal abduction and extradition” on Turkish 
citizens in third countries.59 Furthermore, it accuses the Turkish government of using the 
Directorate for Religious Affairs to “pursuing opposition leaders from the Gulen movement.”60 
In one of the strongest statement as of yet, this document calls on the EU and member states to 
investigate “this serious violation of sovereignty and public order.”61 This is not simply a 
narrative of anti-accession, this is open conflict narrative. With this in mind, the document calls 
once again for suspension of accession negotiations, but in language that is substantially 
stronger. It goes on to state that accession negotiations no longer have a positive effect on 
Turkey.62 In its boldest move, it calls for the relationship to be “redefined in terms of an effective 
partnership.”63 The document emphasizes modernization of the Customs Union, visa 
liberalization, and foreign policy dialogues, framed as a replacement of the status quo. While 
other accession documents have recommended cooperation, none has gone this far. This is 
incredibly important, as this represents a tectonic shift in accession narrative. What this is 
effectively calling for is not, in truth a suspension, but an ending of accession negotiations. 
Observations 
In sum, we can see a clear trend on a variety of accession narratives. First, the stance of 
the Commission on Turkey’s accession credibility shifts from clear to uncertain, and, finally, to 
doubtful. This represents a slow but steady alignment with the language of EP resolutions, 
adhering from a convergence narrative towards a conflict narrative. This contrasts sharply with 
the official documents available from the Turkish government, which insist upon both Turkey’s 
progress on the acquis and its desire to accede to the Union. Second, the increase in references to 
a need for increasing customs ties, institutionalization of foreign and economic policy dialogues, 
and high level talks all increase as uncertainty about Turkey’s accession increases. The narrative 
shifts from one of alignment to one of joint interest, the essence of the cooperation narrative. 
Third, narratives of divergence proliferate over this period. This can be seen clearly as 
increasingly strong language is used to address Turkey’s accession issues, from rule of law to 
                                                          
58 European Parliament. 2019. European Parliament Resolution of 13 March 2019 on the 2018 
Commission Progress Report on Turkey (2018/2150(RSP).  
59 Ibid 
60 Ibid 
61 Ibid 
62 Ibid 
63 Ibid 
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freedom of expression. As this narrative of divergence increases, there is an increase in the use of 
juxtaposition with other accession states, often used to highlight apparent disparities in the two. 
 
Changes in Public Rhetorical Narratives 
This leads us to the question of public narratives. In order to place these changes in their 
proper context, it is necessary to show how public rhetoric by political leaders on both sides of 
the accession process has shifted over time. How they frame the issue of Turkish enlargement 
demonstrates not only how these institutions view the process, but how they want the public to 
respond. Importantly, narratives do not seem to vanish entirely, simple losing prominence in 
discourse. While less concrete in nature than their legal cousins, analysis of the rhetoric of major 
players in the process yields considerable insight into actors’ perspectives on enlargement. This 
analysis has gone through a number of cases but will highlight a few specific cases for study. In 
the case of the European Union, the opinions of three main actors are integral to understanding 
changing perspectives.  
 
The European Union 
When viewing the European perspective, the most important voice on the topic is that of 
the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker. As head of the commission, his 
voice on the matter can be held to be authoritative, and, moreover, he has the largest stage to 
present his view. In Juncker’s case, this will be highlighted by excerpts from each of his State of 
the Union address as well as four separate speeches. 
First, the most prominent example of EU public rhetoric is the State of the Union speech 
by the President of the Commission. This speech is meant to sum up the past year and establish 
the Commission’s plan of action in the coming year. Consequently, one can judge the importance 
of an issue by how it is handled in this high-profile event. In this piece, we will walk through 
how Turkey and accession are handled in each speech between 2015-2018, noting the changing 
tone and perspectives.  
After his statements at the beginning of his presidency, it would seem the President of the 
European Commission had little to say on the topic in 2015, and consequently, that State of the 
Union has little to offer us on the topic, and consequently, it can be concluded that this topic was 
not viewed as particularly important to the Commission that year. In the absence of his 2015 
State of the Union, one need only look to his speeches during the Spitzenkandidat race and 
immediately thereafter. Juncker pointedly stated that Turkey would not enter the Union on his 
watch, while in the same breath shutting the door on enlargement for five years: 
 
“No further enlargement will take place over the next five years. As regards Turkey, the 
country is clearly far away from EU membership. A government that blocks twitter is 
certainly not ready for accession.”64 
 
This gives us an idea of his stance during 2014. This needs to be born in mind when considering 
the drastic change in the following two years. Early in 2016, he notes that Turkey is “a difficult 
partner” and that he has grave concerns over human rights and press freedom there but concludes 
                                                          
64 Juncker, Jean-Claude. 2014. A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and 
Democratic Change. Strasbourg, 22 October 2014 
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that the migration crisis required Turkish cooperation to fix it.65 Later that year, enlargement 
garners substantially more attention from the State of the Union, held months after the coup in 
Turkey. Therein, he includes multiple paragraphs to the topic of accession, specifically noting 
that Turkey’s cooperation on matters of migration had “brought new impetus”  to its accession 
process.66 He followed this up in his closing remarks to the European Parliament. Interestingly, 
he takes a remarkably lenient view of the accession process, urging his colleagues to “be more 
patient over certain aspects” of the process.67 He stated that he was “certain that this would be 
done,” though he doubted that it would adhere to the timeline.68 This is remarkable in its timing, 
as the coup attempt was two months old at this point, and the issues that would later dominate 
the dialogue already had been noted by many Europeans, even in the Commission documents.  
Considering these previous statements, the 2017 State of the Union stands in stark 
contrast. Herein, the President of the Commission pointedly states that the Western Balkans have 
a “credible enlargement perspective,” pointing out the that the EU will be “greater than 27 in 
number” in years following his term.69 This is in sharp contrast to his following statements in 
Turkey. Here, instead of encouraging the them as he did in the previous year, he instead takes an 
antagonistic stance, castigating them for failing in rule of law and justice. Pointedly, he rules out 
Turkish accession for the “foreseeable future.”70 This becomes an entire paragraph listing the 
wrongs of Turkish leadership in the Commission’s highest profile stament of the year. Later that 
year, he raises the question of whether the EU should end accession negotiations, stating that 
“Turkey is moving away from Europe.”71 Importantly, he also puts forth the idea that Erdogan 
wants the EU to end negotiations so that it is the EU’s fault.72 In 2018, his state of the Union 
returned to silence on the matter once again, though his silence has not been total. After the 
Conference between the EU and Turkey in Varna, Bulgaria, Juncker spoke of his disappointment 
with how things have progressed, stating that Turkey needed to improve ties with Greece and 
Cyprus.73 More importantly, Juncker referred to the relationship as a strategic partnership, yet 
again.74 This term ‘strategic partnership’ further reinforces the cooperation narrative, but limits 
any progress on accession. 
 
                                                          
65 Juncker, Jean-Claude. 2016. 14th November Schmeizer Lecture – Lecture by European 
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, “The European Union – a Source of Stability in a 
Time of Crisis.”  
 
66 Juncker, Jean-Claude. 2016. 2016 State of the Union.  
67 Ibid 
68 Ibid 
69 Juncker, Jean-Claude. 2017. 2017 State of the Union. 
70 Ibid 
71 Juncker, Jean-Claude. 2017. Speech by President Juncker at the EU Ambassadors’ Conference. 
72 Ibid 
73 Yackley, Ayla Jean. EU fails to win concessions from Turkey on rights concerns. Financial 
Times. Last Accessed: 03/29/2019. https://www.ft.com/content/dbefa9e6-313d-11e8-b5bf-
23cb17fd1498  
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Turkish Elites 
On the Turkish side, it is clear that the President of Turkey is the prime signaler with 
regards to Turkish public rhetoric. With this in mind, his drastic shift in tone is a key indicator, 
not only of EU-Turkish Relations, but of how the issue is framed in the mind of Turkish public 
narratives on accession.  
Recep Erdogan’s stances have developed along a clearly antagonistic path since 2014. In 
this year, his tone is hopeful, stating that he expected progress on the matter, with help from his 
French counterpart.75 He regretted the fifty year wait, but his tone avoided placing blame on any 
source, emphasizing instead amicable relations.76 A year later, the tone is harsher. When asked 
about Accession, he stated that it was an ongoing process, and that even if the EU failed to admit 
Turkey soon, Turkey would “determine its own path.”77 His rhetoric takes a sharp turn when he 
mentions a conspiracy of Islamophobia and states that the Accession process is a key method of 
disproving this, explicitly saying “we are testing Europe.”78 He follows this up with a key 
statement. He directly challenges the EU, stating that Turkey will not beg for membership, and 
will “determine its own path.”79 It is worth noting that this statement follows the Commission’s 
insistence that there would be no enlargement during its tenure by less than four months.  
The spike in the irregular migration through the Anatolia in 2015 led to unprecedented 
cooperation between in the Turkey and the EU; this rapprochement is clearly reflected in 
Erdogan rhetoric. Later in 2015, Erdogan emphasizes the nearness of eastern Europe to Turkey, 
stating that these lands are no longer far away…we have the means to be together constantly.”80 
During his trip to Slovenia, he garnered further support for Turkey’s accession, stating that 
process was blocked due to political reasons.81 Importantly, he emphasized Turkey’s desire to 
join the Union while pointing out the unevenness of EU support for Turkey.82 He furthermore 
emphasized that his goal of a new democratic Turkey can be achieved through a faster accession 
process.83 Meeting with Belgium later that year, Erdogan stated that accession was Turkey’s 
“most important international priority.”84 Later that year, he emphasized in his press conference 
with Donald Tusk that the enlargement process is “one of the EU’s most effective political tools” 
and that the Europe’s destiny is Turkey’s as well.85 
                                                          
75 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip. 2014. Turkey is the Most Adjusted Country to Acquis of the EU. 
76 Ibid 
77 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip. 2015. Turkey’s Accession to the EU: “Turkey is a Strong Country 
Now; It Will Not Come to You Begging for Accession.” 
78 Ibid 
79 Ibid 
80 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip. 2015. The Relations Between Turkey and Slovenia Will Grow 
Stronger in All Spheres 
81 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip. 2015. Turkey is Key to not only Political but Also Economic Stability 
for the EU.  
82 Ibid 
83 Ibid 
84 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip. 2015. Turkey’s Progress is a Success Story That Inspires Many 
Countries.  
85 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip. 2015. It is Not Possible to Consider Europe’s Destiny and Future 
Apart from Turkey.  
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 His rhetoric takes a truly sharp turn after the 2016 coup attempt. At the International 
Business forum late in 2016, he states that “No matter how far you advance in economy, culture, 
politics and trade, you can never escape being second class in the eyes of the West.”86  
Importantly, he calls on the EU to make its “final decision,” placing the onus on the Union.87  
Three days later, after criticism of Turkey’s re-adoption of the death penalty, he responded to the 
EU by saying “you do not control the fate of our nation, we do.”88 This places Turkey and him at 
odds with accession criteria and signals a key divergence. He went on to state that his nation 
would take “matters into its own hands”, claiming that the EU should keep its promises.89 The 
following year, he went on to emphasize that “We have never seen ourselves outside of the EU, 
yet they haven’t taken us into the EU.”90 He went on to state that the EU had different criteria for 
states other than Turkey and that the people would have to reassess whether its EU perspective.91 
According to Erdogan, a “new period will start” after the April 16 referendum.92 He goes on later 
that month to insist that the EU’s threats to freeze accession “does not mean much to us.”93 In an 
interview with CNN, he accused the EU of increasing accession criteria arbitrarily to keep out 
Turkey, insisting that the “EU has closed its doors to Turkey.”94  Later that year, he insisted that 
the EU was hypocritical in its criticism of Turkey, refusing to hold themselves to the same 
standard.95 He went on to insist that Turkey “stood ready” join the EU, and that it would not be 
the one to end the accession negotiations.96 As in previous statements, he insisted that 
membership was not important to Turkey, insisting that “it will make no difference to us, we will 
continue on our path.”97  In 2017, he issues a clear stance on EU-Turkish Relations, Erdogan 
stated: 
 
“My dear brothers, a battle has started between the cross and the half moon. There 
can be no other explanation.”98 
 
The shift in Erdogan’s rhetoric can be seen most clearly in his Europe day speeches, a 
key opportunity every year for him to comment on the EU and the idea of Europe. In each 
version of the speech between 2016 and 2018, he insists that accession is a strategic goal for 
Turkey. In 2016, he does not accuse the EU of keeping Turkey out, instead saying that visa 
                                                          
86 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip. 2016. Orientalism Still Dominates West’s View of the East. 
87 Ibid 
88 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip. 2016. Our Nation Makes Its Own Decisions 
89 Ibid.  
90 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip. 2017. The EU Issue Will Be Talked Over Again after April 16.  
91 Ibid 
92 Ibid 
93 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip. 2017. The Winner of the New System is Our Nation 
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liberalization could “help relieve…weariness caused by Turkey being kept waiting.”99 This 
contrasts sharply with 2017, where he claims that islamophobia is “poisoning EU-Turkey 
relations.”100  In 2018, he continues this, blaming lack of accession progress on the “ambitions of 
some member states.”101  In his May5, 2016 address, he insists that the EU must pursue an 
“inclusive vision,” commending Europe for stepping up its commitment to solving the 
“humanitarian tragedy” of migration.102 Importantly, He insists that Turkey will “continue to 
work with EU.”103 In contrast with his later speeches, he makes a brief mention of Islamophobia, 
saying that he hoped that the EU did not become a place defined by it. Importantly, this is not an 
accusation, and is hopeful in its tone. In his later versions of the speech, he accuses the EU of 
becoming captive of racism, discrimination and islamophobia, condemning the silence of 
Europe’s leaders. He insists that these values are alien to the EU and should be rejected.   
 
Observations 
It is quite clear from this examination that each side is playing a classic blame game. 
Both sides of the argument are placing the failings of the accession process at the feet of the 
other. Both have claims to back up their position, but this has resulted in a hardening of 
sentiments, not a backing down. Juncker’s statements as President of the Commission have never 
been very favorable to Turkish accession, as evidenced by his statements in his Foreign Policy 
priorities. The only time that they perk up, taking on a brighter more encouraging tone, is when 
the Migration Crisis requires Turkish support in 2016. In the wake of the Joint Action Plan with 
Turkey, he calls on his colleagues to be patient with Turkey, interesting since his statements in 
2017 are anything but patient. His narrative moves from one of conflict in 2014 and 2015 to 
cooperation in 2016, and swings strongly back to conflict in for the remainder of the time.  
Erdogan, on the other hand, continually pairs conflict narratives with cooperation. While conflict 
is low in the 2014, his narrative of conflict slowly increases over time, but he uses inflammatory 
narratives of victimization regularly. While cooperation lessens slightly, it never evaporates 
entirely. 
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Correlating Narrative and Public Opinion 
 
Senyuva, Ozgehan. 2018. Turkish Public Opinion and the EU Membership. The Future of EU-Turkey  
Relations. 
On the Accession Process 
With these findings in mind, we need to place them in chronological perspective 
alongside changes in Turkish opinion. First, a look at Turkish opinions on accession is needed. 
An examination the graph above yields intriguing results. Support for EU membership clearly 
decreases over time, from the beginning of negotiations to present. By itself, this begs the 
question of whether the accession process has helped or hindered Turkey’s view of the EU. 
Moreover, anti-membership sentiment hits all-time highs (39%) at the same time as the 
Commission states that accession is off the table for his tenure in Fall of 2014. Pro-Accession 
sentiment drops to its lowest point (28%) at exactly the same time. Considering the pro-
accession narratives coming out prior to this, this change in the credibility of accession from the 
Commission has significant impacts. 
 In the following year, increased rhetoric of cooperation from both sides of the discussion 
result from the need to address the Migration Crisis. As a result, pro-accession views skyrocket 
whilst the narratives focused on cooperation, hitting 39% in the Spring of 2016. Anti-Accession 
sentiment drops proportionately to 24%. Narratives surrounding the coup attempt showed 
Commission support for the legitimacy of the Turkish response, while lauding their aid in 
dealing with the migration crisis. This joins with Erdogan’s narrative of a pro-accession focus in 
early 2016, reinforcing the strong public support for accession. Interestingly, the events of the 
coup attempt and the narratives surrounding it saw a sharp reversal of this trend in fall of 2016. 
 It is at this time that we see Erdogan’s narrative turn sharply anti-accession, and the 
blame game intensifies on both sides soon thereafter. This is also when we see the European 
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Parliament begin to propose freezing of the accession process. This turn of events has had a 
powerful impact on public sentiment. From fall of 2016 to fall of 2017, the threat of ending 
accession negotiations mobilized powerful pro-accession support (47%), likely amplified by the 
post-coup attempt crackdown. This culminates in the most recent surveys and polls out of 
Turkey in 2018. Now that there is yet another EP proposal to suspend accession talks entirely in 
favor of a strategic partnership, Turkish sentiments have become polarized. Over the period in 
question, there has been a continual increase in the levels of ambivalence towards accession, 
culminating in Spring of 2017 (31%). The crackdown and subsequent threats to remove 
accession entirely have resulted in a sharp decline in ambivalence, representing only 1% of the 
populace currently. Noticeably, the figures in favor sit at 49% while the figures against find 
themselves at 50%. Considering the 2017 numbers, this means that the majority of the anti-
accession figures were likely drawn from the ambivalents.  This runs true to the change in 
narrative being presented in the 2018 documents, the European Parliament reports and Erdogan’s 
statements.  
 
Senyuva, Ozgehan. 2018. Turkish Public Opinion and the EU Membership. The Future of EU-Turkey  
Relations. 
 
On Public Trust 
Next, we must assess Turkish trust in the European Union and faith in Accession over the 
same time period. It is important to note that Turkish trust in the EU has been low ever since the 
Cyrpus issue reared its head in 2006. Prior to this, trust in the EU predominated until accession, 
wherein it began to oscillate. After the freezing of accession chapters over Cyprus recognition, 
trust began to erode rapidly, with net trust hitting -31% in Fall of 2007. This trend continues until 
spring of 2009 when discussions on opening new accession chapters begins, and even then, net 
trust only raises to -10%. After this spike, public trust plummets to new lows, bouncing between 
roughly -40% and -30% between fall 2010 and spring of 2014. During this period, there is little 
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in the way of progress towards accession and narratives from the Barroso Commission were 
never strongly por-accession, and narratives from Turkey begin to conflict with EU. It is worth 
noting that the lowest point of trust in the EU coincides with Juncker’s statements on Turkish 
accession in fall of 2014, reaching a low of -49% at in the Fall of 2014.  The spike in trust in the 
following year is remarkable, going from -49% to +10%, seemingly overnight. What can explain 
this? 2015 brought unprecedented dialogues between the EU and Turkey during this period. 
Several high-level dialogues and promises of visa liberalization, cooperation on migration and 
energy all permeated the narratives of both sides. The legacy of this cooperation narrative can be 
seen in a much higher average trust level after the 2015 spike, bouncing between -21% and -18% 
rather than the prior -40% and -30%.  This trend has continued until the present. It bears 
mentioning that these findings demonstrate substantial seasonality, as spikes in net trust post 
2007 nearly always occur in spring.  
Conclusions 
These correlations yield substantial implications. Prolonging the accession process begins 
to take on substantial negative consequences for Turkish perceptions of the EU, and arguably, 
the values it has come to represent. Over this same period, we have seen an increase in counter-
conduct from Turkish elite and a precipitous drop in public trust in the EU and its accession 
process. This is borne out by the changing narratives present on both sides. While support for 
Turkish accession has never been terribly remarkable in the years following candidacy status, the 
tone of the narrative has shifted from one of convergence to cooperation, and of late, to outright 
conflict. Over the course of the Juncker Commission, the accession process has become a 
poisoned well from which both parties refuse to cease drinking. A focus on strategic cooperation 
is perhaps a safe third way out of this conflict, one that has been highlighted by both parties as 
time goes on. If the goal of the European Commission is alignment of Turkey with the EU 
acquis, then it needs to consider a new path. Turkey’s progress in the economic sections of the 
accession process is difficult to dispute, and both sides of the process have recognized the 
necessity of deepening foreign policy ties. Neither of these things require accession.  
Perhaps more importantly, this route allows both to claim victory in the blame game they have 
both played, while preserving the necessary integration measures needed for the prosperity of 
each.  
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